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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

ALVIE PETERSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

ROYDON K. :McCULLOUGH, dha
ROYDON K. ~lcCULLOUGH CO.,

Case No. 8298

Defendant and Appellant,
vs.

HENRY L. ASHTON, et al
Third-party Defendants, and
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACT
The plaintiff herein brought this action for a breach
of contract for the constructjon of a theater building at
838 West North Temple Street in Salt Lake Cit~,, Ptah,
against the defendant under ,a complaint filed on the 3rd
day of December, 1951, which complaint was thereafter
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amended and the second complaint filed on the 14th day
of April, 1953, to which second amended complaint the
defendant made answer. The third party defendants are
sub-contractors, with the exception of the Beuhner Block
Company, which supplied the building blocks in question
for the construction of the said theatre building. On
April 13th, 1950, the plaintiff went into possession of
said building before the same was completed in accordance with provisions of said contract, and thereafter
commenced operation of said theatre (R-322, R-835).
The Baid building contract provides for final payment to
be made "Ten days after substantial completion of the
work provided the work be then fully completed and the
contract fully performed." (Pl). Final payment was made
by the plaintiff at the time of taking possession of the
building by is:suing to the defendant a Promissory Note
in the sum of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00). Said
note was fully paid by the plaintiff to the defendant
personally on l\tfarch 1st 1951 (R-837).
The plaintiff being dissatisfied with the workmanship in the construetion of the building, .and the materials
supplied, prote.sted to the defendant in January, 1950.
That on or about January 7th, 1950, the plaintiff and
the defendant entered into a memorandum agreement,
written upon a letterhead of the defendant, in words and
figures as follows :
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Roydon K. :McCullough, Co.
General Contractors and Engineers
676 G Street, Salt Lake City, Utah
Phone El\1pire 3-2151
:Mr. Alvie Peterson,
1241 \Vhitlock Avenue,
Salt Lake City, Utah.

January 7th, 1950

Dear Sir:
In accordance with our discussion with you and l\ir.
Evans, your architect, .and as was verbally agreed at
the meeting, we propose to thoroughly point up and fill
all masonry joint.s in the exterior of the hollow block
masonry work on your theatre at 838 West North Temple
Street. We also propose to paint these walls with a
he·avy coat of lead and oil paint.
This work is to be done in full compensation for
our failure to install certain items of steel in the hollow
block pilaster walls, in a satisfactory manner, also, for
our failure to fill pilaster cores with cement mortar, and
to completely bed vertical block joints as shown and
specified.
Henry L. Ashton
Roydon K. McCullough
Accepted: Alvie Peterson
Date: 1/10/50. (R-253)
The plaintiff has contended throughout the trial of
this case that memorandum agreement, above set out,
was never performed or kept by the defendant, Roydon
K. McCullough, nor by his subcontractor, Henry L.
Ashton, and that the work was never completed in a
satisfactory 1nanner as agreed upon. After the above
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agreement was signed by the parties, as set forth, the
defendant and his subcontractor proceeded with the construction of the theatre building. It is admitted that the
plaintiff visited the .site where the building was being
constructed approximately twice a day and observed
the work there being carried on by the defendant and
his subcontractors, but did not inspect the same. It is
true that the plaintiff chose the color of the paint to be
used and was present when at least part of the w.all was
being painted, but took no part in the direction or management of the work of the defendaTIJt or hi.s subcontractors. On or about November 3rd, 1949, the defendant and
Henry L. Ashton, entered into a subcontract, and pursuant thereto the s.aid Henry L. Ashton agreed to do the
m:asonry work for said building in accordance with the
plans and specifications of the original contract entered
into by and between the plaintiff .and defendant (R-156
to 162 inclusive). On or about November 3rd, 1949, the
defendant entered into a subcontract with William A.
Earl and William A. Earl, Jr., dba William A. Earl &
Son, Plastering Contractors, wherein and whereby the
said vVilliam A. Earl and vVilliam A. Earl, Jr. agreed to
do the lathing and plastering of said building in accordance with the plans and specifications of the original
contract entered into by and between the plaintiff and
the defendant (R-83-151).
A Second Amended Complaint of the plaintiff was
filed on April 14th, 1953, in the above named court
(R-109 to 112), the plaintiff alleging among other things,
that he had duly fulfilled all the conditions of the contract on his part to be performed, and that the defendant,
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Roydon I<:. ~icCullough had not, but on the contr,ary
failed to complete the erection of the said building, and
that portion which was erected was done in an unskillfull and negligent manner, and used in the construction
of .said building unsuitable and inferior materials. That
on or about the 1st day of July, 1951, cracks were
observed in the interior walls of said building. That
on or about the 1st day of July, 1951, the roof developed
leaks, and the plaster fell within the interior from the
walls and ceilings, and that the building cracked, becan1e
dirty and untentable.
The plaintiff further alleged that he had been
damaged in certain items ,set forth in said second
amended complaint in the total sum of $60,000.00, because
of f.aulty construction and lack of compliance with the
contract in the use of suitable and proper materials
in accordance with the plans and specifications for the
construction of said building.
The issues having been joined a trial wa.s had on the
case, commencing on the 8th day of February 1~):5+, and
extending until the 4th day of March 1954.
Findings of Fact were signed by the court on the Gth
day of October, 1954. The court finding that the plaintiff
had duly fulfilled all the conditions of the contract on his
part to be fulfilled and that the defendant had not, to
the damage of the plaintiff, as a conclusion of law, as
follows:
1. For damages arising by reason of defective ma-

terial.s and work done in roofing the building, damage to
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drapes, wood work, equipment, etc., the plaintiff is
entitled to the sum of $1,000.00.
2. For the expense and cost to repair the roof, or
reroof the building the plaintiff is entitled to the sum of
$1,500.00.
3. As damages for the use of building stone and
cinder blocks different from that provided by the contr.act, and for the lack of mortar in the masonry work,
and the defective plaster, requiring replastering of said
building, the plaintiff is entitled to the sum of $5,300.00.
4. For damages to the cement floor the plaintiff is
entitled to the sum of $300.00.
5. For loss of revenue during the time the building
will be under repair the plaintiff is entitled to the sum
of $121.26.
6. For damages for the removal and storage and
replacement of equipment during the time the building
will be under repair the plaintiff is entitled to the .sum
of $350.00.
7. The plaintiff is entitled to his costs herein.
l\1aking a total judgment of $9,507.66, which judgment
was duly made .and entered by the court on the 6th day
of October, 1954, awarding such judgment to the plaintiff
against Roydon K. McCullough, dba Roydon K. McCullough Company, together with the plaintiff's costs and
disbursements incurred in the pro.secution of the action.
The third party defendants, to-wit: Henry L. Ashton;
Block
Comp.any,
a provided
Utahby Corporation;
E.Services
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Lambert, dba Lambert Roofing Company; William A.
Earl and William A. Earl, Jr., dha William A. Earl &
Son, Plastering Contractors, as third p.arty defendants
were brought into the case by Roydon K. :McCullough,
dba Roydon K. McCullough Company, third party plaintiff, under actions filed against each of the said third
party defendants. The .actions, during the course of the
trial, were duly dismissed against the Buehner Block Co.,
L. E. Lambert Roofing Company, and William A. Earl
& Son, Plastering Contractors. The action against Henry
L. Ashton was not dismissed.
On October 13th, 1954, defendant and third party
plaintiff filed with the above court a motion for a new
trial as to all of the parties and as to all of the issues
involved in the action (R-196).
On October 29th, 1954, the defendant and third party
plaintiff filed with the court another motion to vacate
the findings and conclusions and judgment of the plaintiff, Peterson, signed on the 6th of October, 1954 (R-198,
200).
On the 9th day of November, 1954, a hearing ·was had
upon the defendant's and third party plaintiff's foregoing motions, and on the 12th day of November, 1954,
the court signed an order denying the motion to set aside
the findings, conclu.sions, and judgments of the Plaintiff,
Peterson, and the third party defendant, Earl, also denying a motion for a new trial, and giving third party
defendant, Ashton, Until November 19th, 1954, to file
findings, conclusions and judgment. Otherwise, defendSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ant could do it for him. Plaintiff's judgment was also
corrected to the total amount of $9,571.26. Said order
of the court was filed of record November 16th, 1954
(R-201-203).
Notice of Appeal was filed December 8th 1954 by
'
' .
defendant, 1\1cCullough, appealing from the judgment
and order of the trial court (R-211-212). On December
13th, 1954, the court filed for record the findings and
conclusions :and judgment of the third party defendant,
Buehner Block Company (R-213-218).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Point I.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT
THE DEFENDANT USED A BUILDING STONE AND
CINDER BLOCK DIFFERENT THAN THAT PROVIDED IN
THE CONTRACT, AND DID NOT ERR IN FURTHER FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF, PETERSON, HAD NOT
Vf AIVED THE RIGHTS HE HAD WITH REFERENCE TO
THE BLOCKS USED IN SAID THEATRE BY NOT OBJECTING TO THEIR USE AFTER KNOWING OF THE SAME.
Point II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING DAMAGES
TO THE PLAINTIFF, PETERSON, WITH REFERENCE TO
A LACK OF MORTAR IN THE MASONRY IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF SAID BUILDING, AND THE PLAINTIFF
DID NOT WAIVE ANY RIGHTS TO SUCH DAMAGES, EXPRESSLY OR BY IMPLICATION.
Point III.
THE PLAINTIFF, PETERSON, BY TAKING POSSESSION
OF SAID BUILDING, PAYING THE CONTRACT PRICE, AND
MAKING NO OBJECTION TO MATERIAL USED, AND THE
MANNER OF ~CONSTRUCTION, DID NOT WAIVE ANY
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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RIGHTS HE HAD TO DAMAGES, AND IS NOT ESTOPPED
FROM ASSERTING THE SAME, AND IT WAS NOT ERROR
FOR THE LOVIER COURT TO AWARD SUCH DAMAGES.

ARGUMENT
Point I.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT
THE DEFENDANT USED A BUILDING STONE AND
CINDER BLOCK DIFFERENT THAN THAT PROVIDED IN
THE CONTRACT, AND DID NOT ERR IN FURTHER FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF, PETERSON, HAD NOT
WAIVED THE RIGHTS HE HAD WITH REFERENCE TO
THE BLOCKS USED IN SAID THEATRE BY NOT OBJECTING TO THEIR USE AFTER KNOWING OF THE SAME.

Under the arguments set forth in the defendant's
Brief he supports his argument that the plaintiff has
waived his rights to damages accuring under Point One,
Two and Four of His Brief, h;,' references to certain authorities, which will be treated separately and consecutively, to-wit:
17 Corpus Juris Secundum, Page 1100. Contractspar. 415 b, Building and Construction Contracts.
No. 2 under same paragraph, topic Occupancy or
Use.

Birch Electrical, etc., Laboratories vs. Garbutt, 110 P 140, 13 California Appeals, 435;
Morgan v.s. Plotkin, 189 N.W. 63, 219 Michigan 265;
Larson vs. Knight, .a Utah Case, 233 P 2d,
365;
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Rehr vs. West, 76 N.E. 2d, 808, 311 Ill. App.
160;
Leonard vs. Home Builders, 161 P 1151, 174
Cal. 65.
It is the contention of the defendant, McCullough~
that the building stone and cinder blocks complied in
every respect to the requirements of the plan.s and
specifications of the contract between the plaintiff and
the defendant.
Article 9 of the contract provides : R-12.
"Unless otherwise specified, all materials shall be
new and both workmanship and materials shall be of
good quality." The plaintiff contends that the plans and
specifications relating to hollow concrete masonry units
to be used in the theatre building must be viewed in the
light of this provision of the contract, .and when so viewed
the building blocks used by the defendant and his subcontractor did not meet the requirements of said contract
or the plans and specification.s forming a part thereof, as
they were not finished or cured (R-458 line 23 etc. and
460-461). While the specific provision in said plans and
specifications relating to the kind of building blocks to
be u.sed, is silent as to whether or not the blocks should
be finished or cured, yet in order to meet the provisions
of Article 9 above setforth, they must be both new and of
good quality. They may have been new but were not
of good quality as they shrunk after being placed in the
walls (R-459-460-461). Mr. Driggs, ·a licensed and practising research engineer testified that "the cracks in the
plaster are definitely due to the shrinkage of the blocks."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(R-462 and 463). The tenn "good quality" means of such
quality as to be reasonably suited to meet the demand and
requirements of the customer, or as here, the owner of
the building.
Shawnee Gas & Electric Co. vs. Corporation
Commission of Oklahoma, 237 Pac. 838-843,
111 Oakla. 6.
"Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, make.s known to the seller, the particular
purpose for which the goods are required so as to
show the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (r) the goods shall be reasonably fit for the
purpose."
Chitty on Contracts, 7th Edition, Section 13, ( r),
Page 431.
In the case as bar, the plaintiff relied upon the defendant, :McCullough to furnish building blocks which
would be of good quality and reasonably adapted to the
objects and purposes for which they were to be used. It is
only reasonable to construe the provision of the plans
and specifications relating to the ''Hollow concrete
masonry units" to be used in the construction of the
building in the light of Article 9, of the Contra~·t and
that they would be of ~uch quality as not to shri11k after
being placed in the walls (R.458). The plaintiff did not
contract with the defendant for blocks which wore not
cured and ·which would shrink and h)T so using, leave
cracks in the walls, causing the plaster of the interior
walls to crack, leak and leave .apertures for the elements
to come through. Obviously, that would not effectuate the
purposes of the building contract. What reasonable
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person would contract for the construction of a theater
building to be made of blocks which might technically
meet A.S. T .l\L standards, but which were neither cured
nor finished (R-459, 460 and 461). l\1:oreover, the defendant used three different blocks of different compositions
(R-398, 401 and 407), with obviously three different coefficients of expansion and contraction, resulting in a lack
of uniformity in wall composition and expansion and contraction. The defendant therefore, has not met the requirement.s of the contract in the use of building blocks
.as agreed, and the finding of the trial court that he used
blocks "different and defective" than those c.alled for
should be sustained. (Par. 5, sub-section 3 of Findings of
Fact, R-191.)
An extended discussion of this matter was had at
the trial (R-403-464). It is the contention of the plaintiff
that the findings of the court in this regard cannot now
be disturbed under the evidence produced in this case.
In the Case of Rino vs. Statewide Pl'ltmbing & Heating Cornpany, Inc., an Idaho Case, 1953,262 Pac. 2d, 1003,
the court held that in an action for breach of contract
to design and install an adequate heating plant, findings
of the jury that inadequate operation was due to faulty
design, construction and installation, was su.stained by
the ·evidence. Findings based on substantial though confleeting evidence will not be disturbed.
In Yowell vs. The Occidential Life Insurance Company, a Ut,ah Case, 110 Pac. 2d, 566, the court held where
the trial court's findings of fact is ba.sed upon sufficient
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evidence, the Supreme Court will not reverse it, even if
inclined to arrive at a different conclusion than the trial
judge.
In Beckstead vs. Brittan, 142 Pac. 2d 409, a Utah
Case, this court has said that: the Supreme Court would
not disturb the trial court's findings where the evidence
was in direct conflict.
In TuJt vs. Brotherson, 150 Pac. 2d 384, the Utah
Supr.eme Court said: "Where there is evidence to support trial court's findings in an action at law they will
not be upset on appe.al. On appeal the Supreme Court
is bound by trial court's fact finding fairly supported by
evidence.
Cahoon vs. Universal Credit Co., 146 Pac. 2d, 284
in re Knight's Estate, 141 Pac. 2d, 879.

In Staley vs. Grant, 276 Pac. 2d 489, 2 Utah 2nd 421,
the Supreme Court has .said: "On conflicting matters the
evidence is to be viewed in .a light rnost favorable to the
party for whom the judgn1ent was entered, and \vhen so
viewed, if there is evidence supporting the judgment, it
will not be disturbed."
In Miller vs. Ziedrich, 263 Pac. 2d, 611-199 Oregon
505, the Supreme Court of the State said: "The Supreme
Court is without .authority to disturb Circuit Court's decision of fact question on conflicting evidence in action at

l.aw."
There is little question but what this is the general
rule prevailing in the State of Utah, and in practically
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all the States of the Union. So the contention of the defendant, McCullough, that the building stone and cinder
blocks used in the erection of the theatre in question
complied in every respect to the requirements of the
plans and specifications of the contract between the
plaintiff :and defendant has been resolved by the trial
court against such contention, and the finding of such
trial court should not be di.sturbed
The above rule is applicable to the Findings of Fact
of the court as set forth in its findings, found on pages
191 and 192 of the record.
Point II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING DAMAGES
TO THE PLAINTIFF, PETERSON, WITH REFERENCE TO
A LACK OF MORTAR IN THE MASONRY IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF SAID BUILDING, AND THE PLAINTIFF
DID NOT WAIVE ANY RIGHTS TO SUCH DAMAGES, EXPRESSLY OR BY IMPLICATION.

The defendant contends that the plaintiff waived his
rights he might have had, with reference to the court's
findings of lack of mortar in the masonry, and it was
error. for the lower court to award damages for the .same.
The defendant's contention is based principally upon the
conduct of the plaintiff, and the fact that on the 7th day
of January, 1950, he signed and accepted the provisions
in a letter from Henry L. Ashton and Roydon K. McCullough in which they agreed to do certain work, which had
theretofore been performed in a negligent and unskillful
manner. The letter is an adn1ission on their p;art of the
unsatisfactory way in which the building had been con-
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structed. The fact that the contents of the letter was
accepted by the plaintiff constitutes no waiver under the
original agreement for the contractor to proceed in a
workmanlike way with the construction of the building
and in accordance with the plans and specifications of
the original contract. As a matter of fact the contents of
the letter were never performed as agreed to by Henry
L. Ashton and Roydon K. :McCullough, and in no way
released Roydon K. McCullough . from his agreement
signed ·with the plaintiff on November 2nd, 1949.
The defendant further contends that because of the
conduct of the plaintiff that he waived any rights to
damages for the defective work mentioned under Point I I
of the defendant's Brief, claiming that because he selected
the color for the paint to be used on the interior walls,
.and visited the premises on an average of twice a day
during the construction, and failed to object to the
manner in which the building was being constructed, or
to the materials used, ha.s waived his rights to damages.
The defendant cites in substantiation of his position
17 Corpus Juris Secundum, Page 1100, Contracts, Paragraph 5b, Building and Contruction contracts:
"An acceptance of the work of structure, as
in compliance with the contract, will ordinarily
constitute a waiver of a full performance of defective performance of a building contract, and
such acceptance may be expressed or implied
from the conduct of the owner. Whether or not
his acts amount to an acceptance is generally a
question of fact depending on all the circumst~ances of the case. Thus, although particular
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
circumstances in a given case may require a different holding, some of the defects may be waived
by the owner's failing to object thereto at the
proper time, and specifically calling the builder's
attention to other defects; but .a waiver of one
defect is not a waiver of other defects.
"So, where the work or materials is under
the inspection of the owner or his architect during its progress, if the builder is not complying
with the contract, it is the duty of the owner or
architect to object to such work or materials as
obviously do not comply with the contract, and on
hi.s failure to do so the owner cannot, after the
work is completed, claim that the work or materials was not in accordance with the contract,
but this rule does not apply where the contract
contains a provision to the contrary, where the
owner was not required to inspect the building
day by day and had no inspector constantly on
the job, or where the defects were hidden and not
discovered until after completion of the work. So,
mere presence of t~e owner during the construction period without assuming to direct the work
does not constitute a waiver." (Italics ours.)
It is the contention of the plaintiff that he did not
inspect the work, although he was present an average of
twice per day at the place where the theatre was being
constructed.
It is evident that what provoked the letter from
Henry L. Ashton and Roydon K. l\IcCullough to the plaintiff, dated January 7th, 1950, was that a protest had
been made by the plaintiff on ce·rtain iten1s of the work
and con.struction thereof, as can be seen from a pe·rusal
of said letter. Here the owner was not required to inspect
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the building day by day, and had no inspector on the
job for that purpose. J\ioreover, most of the defects were
hidden and not discovered until after the alleged completion of the building. So his mere presence during the
construction period, without ,assuming to direct the work,
which he did not do, does not consitute a waiver.
in the Case of Otto JJ;Jisch Co. vs. E. E. Davis Co., 217
N".W. 38, 40; 241 :Michigan 285, the court said: "Permitting contractors to continue work after protest by architect that specifications were not complied with was not
a vvaiver of compliance or guaranty."
In Rice vs. Plattesburg-Vibbard Coal Mining Company, 229 S.W. 298, the Court held: "vVhere plaintiff
contracted with the defendant to dig a mine shaft, defendant to furnish timbers to be used in curbing and
blocking the same, .and plaintiff protested when the defendant furnished un.suitable material, plaintiff's use
of the materials furnished did not constitute an acceptance of them."
"Nor does an acceptance constitute a waiver of latent
defects of which the owner was ignorant of at the time.'"
Town of Tonawanda vs. Stapell, Mumm & Beals
Corp., 270 N.Y.S. 377. 240 App. Div. 472. City of Seaside vs. Randalls, 180 Pac. 319. Rouge River Fruit &
Produce Association vs. Gillen-Chambers Co., 165 Pac.
679-85 Oregon, 113. Rehearing denied, Hi5 Pac. 1183.

The court has said in the case of Sidney Stevens Implement Co. vs. Hintze, 67 Pac. 2d, 632, a Utah Case,
paragraph 4, page 637 of the Report: "It is argued that
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the defendant supervised the construction of the trailer
and was present for that purpose several days a week. So'
far as we are able to discover from the evidence, defendant .always relied upon the skill and experience of the
plaintiff's workmen, and while present and exhibiting an
interest in the progress of the work and suggesting
changes, he did not a.ssume to direct the work or impose
his judgment as to structuDal requirements. Certainly,
the fract that the trailer, when completed, '\Veighed approximately double the .agreed weight, cannot he ascribed
to anything that the defendant did or suggested in the
construction of it. Nor do we see how his being present
and seeing the work progress can have the effect of a
waiver on his part of the weight agreed upon." The
judgment for the defendant in the lower court was
affirmed.
The defendant cites in support of his contention
Birch Electrical, etc. Laboratories vs. Garbutt, 110 P.140,
13 Cal. A pp. 435. This case is not in point. The defendant
had a supervisor on the job and directed the work himself, as witness the testin1ony of Sirch found on page
141 of the Report: "The witnes.s, Sirch, also testified that
the defendant personally directed the designing, the
placing of the conduits, and their quality, .and passed
upon every step as the work progressed, ineluding the
wiring of the circuits, and how they would have to be,
and the location of eaeh piece of machinery. He instructed what he wanted there, and I did what he said."
In this case the defendant had been on the job t'\Yo or
three hour.s per day, seven days per week, and with his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
supervisor to supervise and direct the construction of
the work. In the case at bar, Peterson, while visiting the
place perhaps twice daily, did not have a supervisor to
direct the work nor did he, himself, direct the work or
supervise the construction, but trusted entirely to the
skill and worlrmanship of the contractor .and his employees. In the Sirch Case the court said "The court
further finds that in respect to the counterclaim of the
defendant against the plaintiff, any damage suffered by
reason of the nonperformance of s.aid contract by the
plaintiff has been waived by reason of the defendant, with
full knowledge of said facts, having paid and accepted
said work." Which finding was by the trial court and
affirn1ed by the court on appeal. In the case at bar the
plaintiff, Peterson, was not in full knowledge of the
defects as many of them were latent and did not come
to light until a year or so after the work had been paid
for and he had gone into possession of the building.
The defendant also cites Morgan v~. Plotkin, 189
~~.W. 63, 219 :Mich. 265, in support of his contention.
This c.ase is also not in point because the defendant had
a plumber on the job who was in charge of the work and
gave the contractor instructions, and also with the defendant's knowledge while the work progres.sed before
the underground returns were covered. In paragraph 2,
page 64 of the report, the court Bays:
"Plaintiff's evidence showed that he faithfully
completed his contact as closely as conditions permitted, with two exceptions, and did some extra
work because of repairs and changes, for which
he made no charge."
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"The first, as he testified, was failure to
cover the little heater he went there to see about
" poss1"bly a week" or longer after they quit, which'
was not there when his men had otherwise finished
the job and left; the second being that he did not
encase the underground returns in crock a.s specified, but instead applied a thick insulated covering protected by a roofing and asphalt-jacket,
which he claimed was the customary method in
such cases, and better than the method specified
by the architect in his contract, which simply
called for crock, with no provision for filling and
sealing the joint.s. He testified that this change
was made with the approval of a steam fitter and
plumber, named Applebaum, who was in charge
of the work and gave him instructions, and also
with the defendant's lmowledge, while the work
progressed, before the underground returns were
covered."
In the case at Bar, as above mentioned, the plaintiff,
Peterson, had no supervisor, or other person on the job
to direct the construction of the work, nor did he himself direct or supervise said construction.
In Sullivan vs. Beneficial Life Insurance Co., 91 Utah
405, 64 Pac. 2d, 351, this court held:
"Party should not be charged with waiver of a
forfeiture· in the absence of knowledge of conditions existing."
The defendant also cites in support of his contention
that there was a waiver on the part of the plaintiff to
damages, the ease of Larson vs. Knight, Utah Case, 233
Pac. 2d, 565, 372, where the court made this staten1ent:
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"Do these circumstances show such a situation
and such co.nduct on the part of the plaintiffs as
to justify the trial court's conclusion that the defendant was excused from his promise to install
the ski tow~ Do they amount to a waiver or
estoppel~ vVe believe they do. A party claiming
a right ought not to appear to acquiesce in nonperformance by the other party until the time has
gone by for such performance .and then claim
damages."
This case is not in point. Knight sold the "Ski Inn" in
P.arley's Canyon, located approximately 18 miles East of
Salt Lake City, Utah, to the plaintiffs, .and agreed at
the same time to install a ski tow. The plaintiffs became
in arrears upon the payxnent of rent and installments upon
the contract. On August 27th, 1948, the defendant notified the plaintiffs he would not install the ski tow unless
they performed their part of the agreement and p.aid
the rent in the amount of $250.00, and insurance
premiums \vhich had not been paid, and which were then
in arrears. Some negotations for the sale of the property
were then carried on by both parties, and finally the
defendant took possession, the trial court finding that
he had a right to so do. The court further held that the
plaintiffs had led the defendant to believe that he would
not be obligated to install the ski tow by conduct .and
acquiescence on their part by their failure to perform
their part of the agreement. No similar situation aro.se in
the case at bar. No where has the plaintiff in this c.ase
led the defendant to believe that he acquiesed or consented to the inferior materials used in the construction
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like manner in which it was constructed, relying entirely
throughout the performance of the contract on the
part of the defendant to comply with the contract and
construct the building and use materials in accordance
with the plans and specifications. At no time did he
notify the defendant that the contract was terminated
because of the inferior materials used, or on account of
the manner of construction. The two cases are entirely
dissimilar. The case cited is no,t analagous to the case
before the court, as the plaintiff's claim for most of the
damages are for defects in workmanship, construction
and materials used, which did not becmne evident until
sometime after the payment of the contract price and
occupancy by him. Hence, the rule laid down in the
Larson vs. Knight ca.se, to-wit:
"a party claiming a right ought not to appear to
acquiesce in nonperformance by the other party
until the time has gone by for such performance
and then claim damages,"
is not applicable in the case under consideration.
Point III.
THE PLAINTIFF, PETERSON, BY TAKING POSSESSION
OF SAID BUILDING, PAYING THE CONTRACT PRICE, AND
MAKING NO OBJECTION TO MATERIAL USED, AND THE
MANNER OF CONSTRUCTION, DID NOT WAIVE ANY
RIGHTS HE HAD TO DAMAGES, AND IS NOT ESTOPPED
FROM ASSERTING THE SAME, AND IT WAS NOT ERROR
FOR THE LOWER COURT TO AWARD SUCH DAMAGES.

In the Case of Van Banducci vs. FrankL. Hickey,
Inc., a California Cas.e, 209 Pac. 2d, 398, the court said:
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"Mere acceptance of completed work under
land leveling contract did not necessarily preclude
land owner from recovering damages for breach
of contract on ground that the work was done in
an unworkmanlike manner, particularly where the
defects were latent or the owner had no reasonable me.ans of ascertaining such defects, and,
when ascertained, gave timely notice thereof even
though the owner had paid the contract price."
In the Case of Sparl,ing vs. Hmtsman, 214 Pac. 2d,
837, a California Case the Court said:
"Where a contract is made with owner of
realty to erect a building on the realty .and there is
a breach by the builder of his covenant to build in
a good and workmanlike manner, neither occupation by the owner, after its supposed completion,
nor payment of the price, though .accompanied by
knowledge by the owner of defective construction,
is sufficient, taken alone, to operate as a
waiver or breach of covenant."
In the Case of the Board of Education of Salt Lake

City vs. vVest et al G-ulbranson, Intervenor, 186 Pac. 114,
55, Utah, 357. On page 118 of the report the court said:
"Nor do we think there was any waiver, under
the circumstances, on the p.art of Con West by
reason of the $700.00 payment made by him to the
appellant to apply on the contract price. The
testimony is clear and convincing that the payment was made, as the trial court finds, before
knowledge that the materials used were inferior
and not in substantial compliance with the specifications and contract."
In the Case of Rehr vs. West, 76 N.E. 2d, 808, 333
Ill. Appeals, 160 cited by the defendant in support of his
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e,ontention that the plaintiff had waived his right to
damages is against such contention as the court s.aid in
that case:
"The acceptance by owner of cement floor
constructed by contractor and the payment therefor constituted a waiver of all visible defects, or
such as could he ascertained by inspection and examination but was not a waiver of .latent defects."
(Italics ours.)
The damages allowed by the trial court as Conclusions of Law were as follows :
1. For damages arising by reason of defective material and work done in roofing the building, damage to
drapes, woodwork, equipn1ent, etc. The plaintiff is
entitled to the su1n of $1,000.00.
2. For the expense and cost to repair the roof, or
re-roof the building the plaintiff is entitled to the smn
of $1,500.00.
3. As damages for the use of the building stone and
cinder blocks different than that provided by the contract, and for lack of n1ortar in masonry work and defective plast<er requiring the re-plastering of said building
the plaintiff is entitled to the sum of $6,300.00.
4. For damages to the cement floors the plaintiff
is entitled to the sum of $300.00.
The aforefoing damages .awarded by the trial court
to the plaintiff were for defects in construction and
inferior materials used the-rein which were dise,overed
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after the contract price had been paid by the plaintiff,
and possession of the building had be,en taken. At the
time the contraet price was fully paid and the building
occupied, the defects had not appeared, and therefore
were, at that time, latent and hidden defects, but under
the weight of authority though he had knowledge of
such defects at the time payment was made and possession taken, such payrnent and possession would not
constitute a waiver of his rights to recover damages for
defective workmanship and inferior materials used, and
the non-compliance with the contract.
In the Case at bar the plaintiff relied entirely upon
the experience, workrnanship and integrity of the contractor, to construct the building in a workmanlike manner, and to use materials called for in the contract,
plans and specifications. In the case just cited, Rehr vs.
West the court held:
"That a contractor who contracts to construct
a cement floor impliedly warrants that the work
will be performed in a good and workmanlike
manner."
The Case of Leonard vs. I-Iomebuilders, 17-1- Cal. 65,
161 Pac. 1151, cited by the defendant in support of his
contention that payment by the plaintiff was waiver of
his rights to damages is also a case against the defendant
and not in his favor. In this case the defendant and
plaintiff executed an agreement in writing for the construction of a house. The plaintiff performed his part of
the agreement with full knowledge of the defective workmanship, and of inferior materials used. The fact of
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his making payment in accordance with his agreement on
the contract and entering into possession with full knowledge of the defects, of con.struction and materials used
did not operate as a waiver of his rights for damages.
The court said in the last paragr.aph of the report, on
page 1153:
"He (the plaintiff) was, not in a safe position
to refuse payment on the ground that his unliquidated damages would be sufficient to defeat
or extinguish his fixed liability for the installments of the contract. While this was not legal
duress or compulsion it is strong evidence against
the proposition that payment in full was a waiver.
The motion for non-suit should have been denied."
In this ease the lower court granted the defendant
a non-suit on the grounds that the plaintiff had waived
his rights to damages for defective work and inferior
rna terials u.sed in the construction of the house because
of his payment in full as required by the contract, and
going into possession with full knowledge of such defects
of construction and inferior materials used, which motion
by the defendant the Appellate court held should have
been denied. The court in this case quoted the ~arne
ruling as vv.as given in Sparling vs. I-Iousemo.n, abov0
cited.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons cited by the plaintiff he
contends that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, made and entered by the trial court, were just and
proper and should not now be disturbed by thi~ court.
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That the m,atters set forth in the defendant's Brief, under
Points 3 and 5 are not pertinent to the plaintiff's case,
and are matters which are not involved in his case, and
not pertinent for him to answer or reply to. The other
points in defendant's Brief, and replied to in this Brief
clearly .show that the judgment of the trial court should
be affirmed. We therefore respectfully conclude and submit for consideration of this court, and that the judgment
of the court below should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,

GLEN S. HATCH
DEAN E. FLANDERS
A.M. MARSDEN
Attorneys for the Respondent
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